Story By: Felix Ernest Odamtten / Muhammed Faisal Mustapha…
Ghana’s national security architecture has sounded an early warning over signs of recruitment and mobilisation of groups that could potentially be deployed for political violence ahead of the 2028 general elections, raising fresh questions about the country’s preparedness to prevent electoral conflict before it takes root.
The National Security Coordinator, COP Osman Abdul Razak, disclosed that the country’s early warning mechanisms had already detected indications of mobilisation, suggesting that preparations capable of fuelling election related confrontation may begin long before political parties formally intensify their campaigns.
The disclosure has placed renewed attention on a critical question facing Ghana’s security and democratic institutions: whether emerging networks can be identified and disrupted early enough to prevent them from becoming instruments of intimidation, violence or electoral instability.
“Our early warning systems have already flagged this. We cannot go to sleep, so to speak,” COP Abdul Razak said, signalling the seriousness with which the security establishment is treating the emerging threat.
His warning also highlights the changing character of political mobilisation, where potential recruits may no longer operate through openly identifiable vigilante groups but through informal networks, community structures and digital platforms that can be difficult to monitor.
The recruitment of groups capable of being used for political violence, the National Security Coordinator indicated, can begin months before an election, making early intelligence gathering and preventive engagement essential to the protection of Ghana’s democratic process.
He warned that waiting until political rallies, campaigns and partisan activities reach their peak could leave security agencies attempting to contain violence rather than preventing it from occurring in the first place.
“By the time campaign rallies are in full swing, we are managing containment rather than genuine prevention,” he said, making the case for an intelligence led approach that begins well before election-year tensions reach their highest levels.
COP Abdul Razak proposed intelligence mapping and broad stakeholder engagement between 12 and 18 months before the elections, followed by intensified engagement and civic education during the nine to 12 month period preceding polling.
He further advocated active monitoring of political mobilisation from at least six months before the elections, with targeted preventive operations where credible threats are identified and where there is sufficient evidence to justify intervention.
The approach reflects a shift from a reactive security model towards prevention, recognising that election related violence is often preceded by recruitment, inflammatory mobilisation, local disputes and escalating political tensions.
But the task is becoming more complicated as political vigilantism itself appears to be changing shape. COP Abdul Razak said the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999), had contributed to reducing the public visibility of organised vigilante groups.
He cautioned, however, that the decline in visible activity should not be interpreted as proof that the phenomenon has been eliminated, warning that some networks may have adapted rather than disappeared.
According to him, groups may increasingly present themselves as “internal security teams,” “volunteer task forces” or “community security initiatives,” while others could fragment into smaller and less visible networks.
Some mobilisation, he added, could take place through social media platforms, encrypted communication channels, local digital networks and private security arrangements, creating new challenges for conventional intelligence and investigative operations.
The transformation has potentially significant implications for the enforcement of Act 999, which was introduced to dismantle political vigilante groups and criminalise organised intimidation and violence associated with political, land, mining and other interests.
COP Abdul Razak stressed that enforcement of the legislation must remain neutral, evidence based and free from political interference, warning that selective enforcement or prolonged prosecution could undermine the law’s deterrent effect.
The challenge before Ghana is therefore not simply the existence of an anti-vigilantism law, but the capacity of state institutions to identify emerging threats, gather admissible evidence and act lawfully before political mobilisation develops into organised violence.
The National Security Coordinator’s disclosure also places a responsibility on political parties to ensure that their mobilisation structures do not become channels for recruiting or financing individuals prepared to intimidate opponents or disrupt public order.
Civil society organisations, traditional authorities, religious leaders and community stakeholders likewise have a role to play in identifying local tensions, promoting political tolerance and supporting early intervention before disputes become security emergencies.
For the security agencies, the coming period will require closer coordination among intelligence services, the Police, Armed Forces, Electoral Commission and other institutions responsible for protecting Ghana’s constitutional order and electoral process.
The emphasis on early intervention is particularly significant because once organised political violence becomes entrenched, the cost of containment can be considerably higher, while public confidence in elections and democratic institutions can suffer lasting damage.
Ghana has developed an international reputation for peaceful political transitions and competitive elections, making the prevention of organised political violence not merely a domestic security concern but an important test of the country’s democratic resilience.
COP Abdul Razak’s warning therefore presents the 2028 elections as a security challenge that must be addressed long before voters reach polling stations. The critical window for prevention, his message suggests, is already opening—and the effectiveness of Ghana’s response will depend on whether early intelligence is converted into timely, lawful and impartial action.
The choice before Ghana is clear: prevent political violence before it gathers momentum, or risk confronting it after the damage has been done. As preparations for the 2028 polls gradually take shape, the National Security Coordinator’s warning is a call for vigilance, institutional coordination and responsible political conduct to ensure that no recruitment network, however concealed, is allowed to threaten Ghana’s democratic order.
